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DIVISIONS AND POWER IN THE INDONESIAN 
NATIONAL PARTY, 1965-1966*
Angus McIntyre
The principal division which split the PNI into two sharply 
opposed factions in 1965-1966 had its origins as far back as 1957, 
when the PKI made spectacular advances in large part at PNI expense 
in the 1957 regional elections in Java and South Sumatra. In Central 
Java, where the PKI supplanted the PNI as the region's strongest party 
(based on the 1955 general elections results) , the PNI reaction at 
the time was most outspoken. Hadisubeno, the regional party chairman, 
blamed the party's poor showing on its past association with the PKI1 
and accordingly urged the party's central executive council to re­
view this relationship. He suggested that the party consider forming 
an alliance with the Masjumi (the modernist Islamic party) and the 
Nahdatul Ulama (NU, the traditional Islamic party).2 A conference 
of the Central Java PNI passed a resolution forbidding cooperation 
with the PKI.3
These acts were interpreted by many as a slap at President 
Sukarno,* who had made it increasingly clear in the preceding months 
that to oppose the PKI was to oppose him as well; however, the party's 
central leadership, no less hostile to the PKI, was unwilling to 
risk such an interpretation and thereby further impair its relations 
with Sukarno. Indeed, only a few months before, Sukarno had indicated 
strong displeasure with the PNI in his address to the party on the 
occasion of its thirtieth anniversary celebrations. He implied that 
PNI members had lost their commitment to the goal of a socialist or 
marhaenist5 society, the realization of which had been his very reason
* The writer would like to express his gratitude to the Jajasan Siswa 
Lokantara Indonesia for providing him with the opportunity to con- 
duct research in Indonesia in 1966 and 1967 and to the Myer Founda­
tion for giving him financial assistance in 1967. I would also 
like to thank Benedict Anderson, Donald Hindley, Michael Leigh, 
and Rex Mortimer for their helpful suggestions.
1. See Daniel Lev, The Transition to Guided Democracy: Indonesian
Politics, 1957-1959 (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project,
1966), pp. 105-106.
2 . Ibid., p . 106.
3 . Ibid., p . 108.
4. Ibid., p . 109.
5. For Sukarno, a socialist or marhaenist society was one which ad­
vanced the social and economic well being of small farmers, farm 
laborers, and others who had been impoverished by imperialism--people 
for whom he had coined the phrase "Marhaen." Soekarno, Marhaen
and Proletarian (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1960), 
pp. . 3 and 5.
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for establishing the PNI in the first place in 1927:6 "Look at your 
face today. Is it the same, or not, as the portrait of 1927? If it 
is the same, thanks to God who be praised, I say. If it is not the 
same, then--self-correction."7 Accordingly, the central leadership 
issued no public rejection of the PKI.8
As it turned out, however, improvement of relations with the 
President involved far more than merely forfeiting the opportunity 
to oppose the PKI openly. It also involved a commitment to a 
Marhaenist society and to whatever means Sukarno chose to adopt for 
its realization. Between 1957 and 1959, a commitment to the President's 
concept of Guided Democracy had been required, and on this matter 
party leaders such as general chairman Suwirjo and central leadership 
council member Hardi, dedicated as they were to the preservation of 
the parliamentary system, were unable to satisfy Sukarno. They 
thereby left themselves open to challenge from the younger leaders 
of the PNI mass organizations who were attracted to Sukarno's brand 
of radical nationalism and supported his concept of Guided Democracy.
Immediately prior to the 1960 party congress the younger leaders 
distributed a brochure to the delegates entitled Appeal Djuli i960 
(July 1960 Appeal).9 Invoking the authority of Mentjapai Indonesia 
Merdeka (To Achieve an Independent Indonesia), a pamphlet written by 
Sukarno in 1933, and its Leninist prescriptions for party composition 
and organization,10 the appeal deplored the "embourgeoisement" and 
"liberalization" of the PNI and its leaders since 1946.11 In order 
to remedy this situation and to restore the PNI to its proper role 
as vanguard party of a marhaen mass movement, it called on the
6. In fact, the Indonesian National Party, founded in January-February 
1946, is organizationally distinct from the party of the same name 
founded by Sukarno in July 1927 and was dissolved by party members 
in April 1931. The post-independence party, however, has not 
recognized such a distinction and therefore dates its founding from 
July 1927.
7. Soekarno, Marhaen and Proletarian, p. 26.
8. Daniel Lev, The Transition to Guided Democracy, p. 110.
9. Appeal Djuli 1960 Organisasi-Organisasi Karya Front Marhaenis
kepada Kongres PNI ke-IX (1960) was compiled and signed by the 
leaders of the following PNI mass organizations: Pemuda Demokrat
Indonesia (Democratic Youth of Indonesia), Gerakan Mahasiswa 
Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian National Student Movement), Kesatuan 
Buruh Kerakjatan Indonesia (Indonesian People's Labor Front), and- 
Persatuan Tani Indonesia (Indonesian Peasants' Front).
10. In this document Sukarno had written that the vanguard party of 
the marhaen mass movement must have a highly centralized organiza­
tion of radical orientation whose leadership would have far reach­
ing power and authority. Mentjapai Indonesia Merdeka (1933),
p. 61. Borrowing the term' as well as the idea from Lenin, Sukarno 
referred to this arrangement of power within the party as democratic 
centralism. Ibid., p. 62.
11. Appeal Djuli, passim.
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congress to elect men of true revolutionary spirit to the party leader­
ship.12 It blamed the PNI's estrangement from Sukarno on those 
party leaders, such as Hardi, who had opposed the President's plan 
"to do away with the liberal form of parliament."13 This proposal 
called for the introduction of functional group representation 
into Indonesia's next parliament and the inclusion of such groups as 
peasants, students, and youth. As prospective beneficiaries of this 
plan, the PNI mass organizations had given it their full support.1^
The leaders of the mass organizations argued that the restoration 
of the party to its vanguard role could only be achieved within the 
context of Guided Democracy and that the preservation of the parliamen­
tary system was associated with the malaise of liberalization which 
had afflicted the party since 1946.15
In light of these statements, the mass organization leaders must 
have regarded the party election results of the 1960 Congress with 
mixed feelings. Ali Sastroamidjojo, who had been complimented in the 
Appeal Dguli for his organization of the Bandung Conference,16 replaced 
Suwirjo as general chairman, but the latter was elected first chairman 
and Hardi was elected secretary general.17 *
The growing prominence of these young leaders in the affairs of 
the party greatly enhanced the President's influence over the central 
leadership, for now there was an emerging group with leadership aspira­
tions and an ideological persuasion similar to Sukarno's whom he could 
threaten to support, should the central party leadership fail to 
accede to his various demands. Indeed, he offered a clear challenge 
along these lines to the incumbent party leadership in his address 
to the PNI Congress in Purwokerto in 1963:
Without being personal, I say that Pak Ali [Sastroamidjojo] 
is already old. This morning I said to Pak Abikusno:
"Bung Abi, why, you're looking old." Bung Hardi is 
old, Pak Sartono is old. They are all old. Don't tell 
me there are no young people, brothers and sisters, 
whose spirit is like Hatta's was when he was still
12. Ibid.
13. Appeal Djuli, p. 12; see also p. 13.
14. For elaboration of this point, see J. Eliseo Rocamora, "The Partai 
Nasional Indonesia, 1963-1965," Indonesia, No. 10 (October 1970), 
p. 150 f.
15. Appeal Djuli, passim.
16. There were other reasons why these leaders supported Ali at the 
1960 party Congress. Firstly, he enjoyed considerable prestige 
within the party as a former prime minister. Secondly, as 
ambassador to jthe United States between 1957 and 1960, he was 
immune to the charges of vacillation, "embourgeoisement," and the 
like which they levelled at the Suwirjo leadership.
17. The other offices were filled by Dr. Moh. Isa (second chairman)
and S. Hadikusumo (treasurer). Antara, July 30, 1960 (morning
edition).
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young, whose spirit is like Tjokroaminoto's was when he 
was still young, like Muljadi Djojomartono's was when 
he was still young and working as a postal clerk, brothers 
and sisters. Rejuvenate, rejuvenate, rejuvenate, rejuven­
ate ! 18
Although Ali was able to survive this challenge and was elected 
general chairman, he was nonetheless aware of his vulnerability to 
the "politicking" of Sukarno on the one hand and to a challenge from 
the young leaders of the mass organizations to whom Sukarno had given 
the nod in his address, on the other. Indeed, one of these leaders, 
Ir. Surachman, the secretary general of Persatuan Tani Indonesia 
(Petani) and one of the signatories of the July 1960 Appeal, was 
elected party secretary general.19
Accordingly, Ali cast off such associates as Hardi, who had 
been elected first chairman at Purwokerto, and second chairman Osa 
Maliki and began to work more closely with Surachman and like-minded 
radicals in following the course which Sukarno was mapping out for 
the party. Clearly, Ali had given priority to improving relations 
with the President in order to secure his own position as party 
leader. Thus, the following year, Sukarno was successful in having 
his conception of Marhaenism, as Marxism adapted to Indonesian con­
ditions, enshrined by the Congress Working Committee (Badan Pekerdja 
Kongres) of the PNI in its Deklarasi Marhaenis or Marhaenist Declara­
tion.20 Sukarno first formulated this notion in 195821 and had been 
urging it on the party ever since.
Some participants at the meeting of this organization, such as 
Hardi, viewed the outcome with alarm. Believing that the distinc­
tion between Marhaenism and the ideology of the PKI had been all but 
obliterated, they assumed that this definition could only work to 
the PKI's advantage. Consequently, they began to entertain deep 
suspicions regarding Sukarno's intentions towards the PNI.
Why did Ali Sastroamidjojo not share these suspicions? Unlike 
most other members of the central leadership council he cherished a
18. Amanat PJM Presiden Sukarno Pada Resepsi Pembukaan Kongres Ke-X 
PNI Pi Purwokerto Pada Tanggal 28 Agustus 1963 (Mimeographed),
p. 8. Sukarno's hostility towards Hardi is particularly apparent 
from the fact that he included him along with Ali and Sartono 
as targets for party rejuventation despite the fact that he was 
fifteen years younger than the former and eighteen years younger 
than the latter.
19. J. Eliseo Rocamora, "Political Participation and the Party System 
The PNI Example" (Paper delivered to the Association of Asian 
Studies Conference, April, 1971), p. 46. The remaining offices 
were filled at the Congress by Dr. Moh, Isa (third chairman),
Dr. Roeslan Abdulgani (fourth chairman), Subamia (fifth Chairman) 
Mh. Isnaeni (deputy secretary general), and S. Hadikusumo 
(treasurer). Antara, September 2, 1963 (evening edition).
20. See Deklarasi Marhaenis (Deppenprop DPP-PNI, January 1, 1965), p. 5.
21. Daniel Lev, The Transition to Guided Democracy, p. 163.
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long political relationship with the President. This relationship 
dated back to the time Sukarno had been leader and Ali a prominent 
member of the first Indonesian National Party founded in 1927. Born 
of this long association was a belief on Ali's part that Sukarno would 
never sacrifice his former party, and his longtime political associates 
within it, to the interests of another political party. It was this 
historical factor peculiar7 to Ali which facilitated his adoption of 
Sukarno-inspired radical policies for the PNI.
After the Congress Working Committee session of November, Ali's 
former friends in the central leadership began to establish more sys­
tematic contact with like-minded regional party leaders such as 
Hadisubeno in Central Java. In this province the party and its front 
organizations, particularly Petani, which was made up of both landlords 
and landless peasants,2-2 had been engaged in a number of physical 
clashes with the PKI's peasant union, BTI (Barisan Tani Indonesia or 
Indonesian Peasant Front), which consisted largely of landless peas­
ants . 2 3 These clashes had occurred after BTI had taken the law, 
namely the Basic Agrarian and Sharecropping Acts of 1960,2 into its 
own hands in March 19642 345 and attempted to implement it in a number 
of so-called "unilateral" actions against landlords who were in many 
cases PNI members or supporters.
Despite the class-based appeals of the PKI, there were few, if 
any, defections by landless peasant members of Petani. This loyality 
was largely a consequence of the skillful appeal by provincial and
local PNI leaders to traditional patroix—client relatioii^ 
and poorer villagers.26 Thus, the PNI was able to maintain its peasant 
support and Hadisubeno was able to mobilize Petani in vigorous support 
of these landlords.
It was not only Hadisubeno who was concerned about these actions; 
so, too, was Ali Sastroamidjojo. Yet, under the constraints he had 
imposed upon himself by the choice to maintain close relations with 
the President, he confined his criticism of the PKI to saying that 
the PNI "cannot agree to those unilateral actions."27 He attempted 
to wield the President's most favored symbols of political unity to
r> J •« »  ^  /
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"to overcome the problem together by consultation [musjawarah], and 
cooperation [gotong-rojong] based on NASAKOM [i.e., the unity of
22. E. Utrecht, "Land Reform in Indonesia," Bulletin of Indonesian 
Economic Studies, 5, No. 3 (November 1969) , p. 817
23. Ibid.
24. For an account of these acts see ibid., passim and Selo Soemardjan, 
"Land Reform in Indonesia," Asian Survey, 1, No. 12 (February 
1962).
25. Merdeka, July 2, 3, 1964, quoted in Polemik, p. 151.
26. Rex Mortimer, "The Ideology of the Communist Party of Indonesia 
under Guided Democracy 1959-1965" (Ph.D. Thesis, Monash University, 
1970) , pp. 7:48-49.
27. Ali Sastroamidjojo, Dengan Apinja Marhaenisme Kita Laksanakan 
Dwikora (Djakarta, July 4, 1964) , pp. 6-7.
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nationalist (NAS), religious (A) and communist (KOM) political 
forces] .,t28
Eventually, on December 12, 1964, following joint consultations 
at the Bogor palace presided over by President Sukarno,28 9 Indonesia’s 
ten political parties produced a statement calling for the peaceful 
resolution of land disputes.
On March 7, 1965, Hadisubeno convened a "Lightning Conference" 
of the Central Java branch of the PNI which, at his instigation, 
condemned the party’s secretary general, Ir. Surachman, for implying 
that the police had been at fault in the handling of a land clash in 
the kabupaten of Bojolali.30 This clash had occurred on November 18, 
1964 in the village of Ketaon where three peasants, presumably BTI 
members or supporters, were shot dead by the local police during a 
dispute with a landlord, presumably a PNI supporter.31 According to 
one source, Ir. Surachman actually paid a special visit to the 
graves of the dead peasants, much to the amazement and confusion of 
local PNI members.3^
In a commentary attached to the announcement of the conference 
decisions, both of which were published under the same cover as 
Buku Putih Adjakan PNI-Front Marhaenis Djawa-Tengah (The White Book:
An Invitation of the Central Java PNI-Front Marhaenis), it was strong­
ly suggested that some members of the PNI’s central leadership council 
were being manipulated by the PKI.33
Just as Surachman’s enthusiastic brand of NASAKOM-style politics 
appeared incongruous, to say the least, to the more conservative PNI 
members in Central Java, so Hadisubeno’s insinuation that some mem­
bers of the central leadership council were PKI instruments appeared 
very heavy-handed even to such like-minded men as Hardi and Osa 
Maliki, who had felt it necessary to phrase their opposition to the 
PKI in pro-Sukarno terms in the hope of avoiding a head-on clash with 
him. No such constraint, however, acted on the outspoken Hadisubeno. 
Accordingly, he became the frankest proponent of the anti-PKI side of 
the issue in the party, even to the extent of occasionally embarrassing 
his political allies.
On March 24, 1965, President Sukarno joined the fray in a speech 
to the "Marhaenist Vanguard Cadres": "I say to the Marhaenists that
28. Ibid.
29. The text of the statement, commonly referred to as the Bogor 
Declaration, may be found in Amankan dan Amalkan Deklarasi Bogor 
(DPP-PNI, pamphlet), pp. 5-6.
30. DPD-PNI Djawa Tengah, Buku Putih Adjakan PNI-Front Marhaenis 
Djawa Tengah, pp. 4-5.
31. Rex Mortimer, "The Ideology of the Communist Party," p. 7:61.
32. Interview, Semarang, December 18, 1966.
33. Buku Putih, p. 11.
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if there are false Marhaenists among them, expel them from the 
Marhaenist group. Why do they hang on to people who are like that?
Yes, if they are false, expel them, expel them from your circle."39 
Later in the speech, the President gave some indication as to what he
meant by the phrase "false Marhaenist": "I say that if there is a
person who calls himself a Marhaenist and he is anti-NASAKOM, or if 
he balks at the policy of Nasakomization, he is a false Marhaenist who
ought to be expelled from the Marhaen group."34 5 Hedging his bets in
public at least, Sukarno mentioned no names.36 Yet, his association 
in this speech, which he delivered only two weeks after the "Lightning 
Conference" of the Central Java PNI, of "false Marhaenists" with those 
opposed to his NASAKOM policy, strongly suggests that it was Hadisubeno, 
for one, whom the President had in mind.
Whatever the case, a plenary session of the central party leader­
ship, held on May 12-13, 1965, ordered Hadisubeno to retire from his 
position as first chairman of the Central Java party council and 
suspended Oemar Said (third chairman, Central Java), Soetopo 
Koesoemodirdjo (first chairman, Kudus branch), and Soegeng 
Tirtosiswojo (first chairman, Tjilatjap branch) from party membership 
on the grounds that their compilation and propagation of the Buku 
Putih had damaged party unity.37 By all accounts, this meeting was 
conducted in an extremely tense and acrimonious atmosphere.38 39
President Sukarno, apparently unsatisfied with the May 14 deci­
sion, returned to the fray in another address to the party on the 
occasion of its thirty-eighth anniversary in July:
Once again I say, quickly kick these false Marhaenists 
out of our ranks! The Sundanese say, iraha deui [when 
again]. Ngadagoan naon deui. It means what else 
are you waiting for? It is already obvious that they 
are false Marhaenists. Kick them out, don't let them 
remain in our ranks!39
The President's use of Sundanese in this speech perhaps suggests that 
he believed that many of the "false Marhaenists" were in the West Java
34. Amanat Gemblengan PJM Presiden Sukarno Pada Kader Pelopor Marhaenis 
Pi Gedung Basketball, Senajan, 24 Maret 1965 (Mimeographed, 
Sekretariat Negara Kabinet President Republik Indonesia), p. 2.
35 . Ibid., p : 4.
36. It has been suggested that he did mention privately whom he con­
sidered to be "false Marhaenists."
37. Surat Keputusan Tentang Brosur dan Pamplet DPD-PNI Djawa Tengah 
(Mimeographed) , pp'. 1-2.
38. See Kepada Kawanku I (August 8, 1965), p. 9 and Kebenaran Meng- 
gugat 2 (Kata Penga'ntar, August 20, 1965), p. 8; ~ Cf. Tendang 
keluar Marhaenis 2 Gadungan!! Pendjelasan Latar Belakang Ideologis 
Politis Tentang Pemetjatan Hardi SH DKK (Deppenprop DPP-PNT, August 
11, 1965), p. 25.
39. Amanat PJM Presiden Sukarno Pada Peringatan Hari Ulang Tahum PNI 
Ke-38 di Stadion Utama Gelor'a Bung Ka'rno Senaj an, Djakarta, 25 
SJuli 1965 (Mimeographed', Sekretariat Negara Kabinet Presiden 
RepuhlTk Indonesia), p. 6.
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(Sundanese) branch of the party. At the very least, it must have 
been apparent to Ali that he had not yet gone far enough to satisfy 
the President.
At the Kesatuan Buruh Marhaenis (Marhaenist Labor Front) Congress 
convened from July 25 to August 1, 1965, Bachtiar Salim Haloho, who 
was reelected general chairman, put forward a resolution which he 
claimed had the full approval of the President. Essentially, it 
stated that if the PNI central leadership did not expel the "false 
Marhaenists" then KBM would refuse to recognize them either as mem­
bers or leaders of the party.1,0 This resolution was followed in 
the next few days by a number of similar ones issued by the leader­
ship councils of other PNI front organizations such as GMNI (Indonesian 
National Student Movement), GPM (Marhaenist Youth Movement), and 
Petani. Whether the front organizations, in collaboration with the 
President, were endeavoring to force Ali's hand on this matter or 
whether Ali himself had mobilized them to clear the way for a final 
showdown with the "false Marhaenists" in a further attempt to appease 
the President is unclear. It is clear, however, that it was Sukarno 
who was calling the tune.
On August 3, Hardi, Mh. Isnaeni, Osa Maliki, Karim M. Duriat, 
Sabilal Rasjad, and Moh. Achmad sent a letter to members of the PNI 
leadership stating that they saw no use in attending the plenary 
meeting of the central party leadership on August 4 on the grounds 
that they believed it, like the preceding plenary session of May 12- 
13, would not provide a forum for free discussion.*1 They wrote, 
however, that they would attend a session of the central leadership 
which would specifically discuss the matter of holding an extraordin­
ary congress "where it is hoped the Father of Marhaenism, Bung Karno, 
will agree to issue an order for the restoration of unity in the PNI 
Front Marhaenis. "1* 2
It was this event which proved the occasion of their suspension 
from the party. The following day the central leadership, in a let­
ter of decision signed by general chairman Ali Sastroamidjojo and 
secretary general Ir. Surachman, suspended the above six as well as 
Hadisubeno from party membership.1*3 This action was greeted favorably 40123
40. Suluh Indonesia, August 2, 1965.
41. Kepada Kawanku I, p. 9.
42. Ibid.
43. Surat Keputusan Tentang Pemetjatan Sementara Sdr. Hardi Cs. 
(Mimeographed, DPP-PNI), pp. 1-2. It is of course true that 
changes in the party leadership at all levels were foreshadowed 
in the Deklarasi Marhaenis of 1964. See J. Eliseo Rocamora, "The 
Partai Nasional Indonesia," pp. 174-175. Whether these particular 
suspensions and the ones that followed were also foreshadowed in 
the declaration cannot, in the writer's view, be established on 
the available evidence. Cf. ibid., p. 176.
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by Partindo1*1* and the PKI1*5 and with alarm by the NU.1*6 The "false 
Marhaenistsas their opponents characterized them, or the "Ten 
Friends,"1*7 as they initially styled themselves, did not drop their 
demand for an extraordinary congress. Indeed, they immediately tried 
to enlist sufficient branch support to call such a congress.1*8
A dispute among the party's leaders over whether to support the 
President or oppose the PKI had thereby been transformed by the Osa 
Maliki faction into a contest for the party leadership as the best 
means of most forcefully presenting their side of the argument without 
at the same time relegating themselves to the ineffectual status of 
a splinter group. And, having flouted the authority of the central 
leadership council, this would almost certainly have been the con­
sequence of failing to appeal to the highest policy-making body within 
the party, namely, congress, to vindicate their actions. Although 
the prospects for such vindication may have appeared dim at that time, 
there was, in fact, no other course open to them.
The position of the Osa Maliki faction was most precarious. All 
they could point to in terms of tangible support was a radiogram 
dated August 21 from Brigadier General Sutjipto, the chairman of the 
fifth (political) section of the Supreme Operations Command (KOTI), 
to all the military commanders of Indonesia, instructing them not to 
interfere in the internal affairs of the PNI/Front Marhaenis. "*9 This 
instruction did not deter the minister/commander of the police force, 
Sutjipto Judodihardjo, from issuing an order on September 6 to all 
local police commanders to prohibit the activities of the "false 
Marhaenists."4 567*90 The police force, in addition to the President, PKI, 
and Partindo, had to be counted among their enemies.
The situation within the PNI changed dramatically and suddenly 
after the central leadership council severely compromised itself in 
the eyes of the army and other anticommunist political groups as a 
result of its statements of apparent support for the short-lived
44. Bintang Timur, August 7, 1965.
45. Harian Rakjat, August 7, 1965.
46. Duta Masjarakat, August 7, 1965.
47. This term refers to the seven members suspended on August 4 in addi­
tion to Oemar Said and Sugeng Tirtosiswojo suspended on May 14,
and Drs. F. Sutrisno. See Kepada Kawanku I, pp. 7-8.
48 . Ibid. , pp. 6-7.
49. Sinar Harapan, October 21, 1965. In terms of intangible support, 
a prominent member of the Osa Maliki faction informed the writer 
that they received "moral support" from General Nasution. Inter­
view, June 26, 1967.
50. J. Eliseo Rocamora, "The Partai Nasional Indonesia," p. 180. A 
copy of the Supreme Operations Command radiogram of August 21 was 
attached to a letter, dated September 8, which Osa Maliki and 
Isnaeni sent to Sutjipto Judodihardjo to protest his order. Ibid., 
p. 180, n. 97. However, this was to no avail as the commanders of 
the Djakarta and West Java police districts issued similar instruc­
tions to those of the minister/commander for their areas of juris­
diction on September 20 and 24. Warta Bhakti, September 21, 25,
1965 .
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Gerakan Tiga Puluh September (September 30th Movement), or Gestapu, 
as it became known. In fact, two PNI statements were published in 
the ensuing days--one in Suluh Indonesia on October 2, which re­
appeared in Patriot (Medan) on October 6, and one in Antara on 
October 2.51 While both may be interpreted as statements of support 
for the September 30th Movement, the Antara one lends itself more 
easily to such an interpretation.
In a subsequent "clarification" issued by the central leadership 
of the events surrounding the emergence of the PNI statement52 of 
October 1, 1965, a list of fifteen men allegedly responsible for its 
formulation was provided.53 Strikingly, the vast majority--twelve of 
the fifteen--were current or ex-leaders of the party’s mass organiza­
tions including such people as Bachtier Salim Haloho of KBM, former 
GMNI leader John Lumingkewas, and Ir. Surachman. 5 * Kama Radjasa 
(first chairman, Djakarta branch), Satyagraha (managing editor of 
Suluh Indonesia') , and Selamat Ginting (acting chairman of the organi­
zation department since Hardi's suspension)55 were the three who had 
not been leaders of the mass organizations.56
As for the other party leaders, general chairman Ali Sastroamidjojo 
was in Peking, third chairman Dr. Moh. Isa was outside Djakarta, fifth 
chairman Subamia was overseas, and Dr. Ruslan Abdulgani "had duties
51. Cf. "Continuity and Change," Indonesia, No. 2 (April 1966), pp. 198- 
201 which points out that the Antara version is different from
the Patriot version but fails to mention that the Patriot version 
is identical to the statement which appeared in Suluh Indonesia 
on October 2.
52. The "clarification" does not account for the fact that two differ­
ent statements of the PNI central leadership appeared in the 
press in the days following the abortive September 30th Movement.
It also leaves the question open as to whether the statement 
which the "clarification" asserts was completed at about 11:30 a.m. 
on October 1 (i.e., when the Gerakan was still in control of 
Djakarta) was the same as either one of the two which was subse­
quently published. It does, however, state that the PNI statement 
was handed over to the Antara press agency at 8:00 p.m. or three- 
quarters of an hour before the first army broadcast announcing
the suppression of the September 30th Movement in Djakarta. It is 
feasible, therefore, that the statement formulated by the leader­
ship council on the morning of October 1 was the same as the one 
delivered to the Antara office before the city had changed hands 
again and published in Antara*s morning edition of October 2. On 
the other hand, the version published in Suluh Indonesia (and 
Patriot) probably did not go to press until after 8:45 leaving 
tfime for its modification in an attempt to take account of the 
dramatic new power shift which took place in the capital after 
8:00 p.m.
53. For the text of the "clarification" see Harian Nasional (Jogjakarta), 
November 5, 1965.
54. Warta Bhakti, August 11, 1965.
55. Ibid.
56. The complete list may be found in Harian Nasional, November 5, 
1965.
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elsewhere."57 Unrestrained by the elder and more experienced party 
members, who presumably would have cautioned restraint in such a 
fluid situation, the leaders of the mass organizations overreached 
themselves on that day.
On October 2, Brigadier General Sutjipto called a meeting of 
representatives of political parties at KOTI headquarters. The PNI 
leadership did not attend, although the Osa Maliki faction was 
present.5® Suluh Indonesia was promptly banned on the grounds that 
it had sided with the September 30th Movement59 which was now being 
generally interpreted as inspired and controlled by the PKI. A few 
days later, the first of the army-sponsored demonstrations against 
the PKI was held in Djakarta.
Encouraged by these events, the Osa Maliki faction publicly set 
its sights on the party leadership in a somewhat cavalier declaration 
which it made on October 6. It "banned the PNI central leadership 
council led by Ali-Surachman"60 on the grounds of "the involvement 
of several members of the DPP-PNI in the counter-revolutionary 
September 30th Movement . . ."61 and established a new leadership 
under the general chairmanship of Osa Maliki. The remaining leader­
ship positions were filled by Hardi (first chairman), Sabilal Rasjad 
(second chairman), Isnaeni (third chairman), Moh. Achmad (fourth chair­
man), Usep Ranawidjaja (secretary general), Abadi (first deputy 
secretary general, I.G.N.), Gde Djaksa (second deputy secretary 
general), and Karim M. Doeriat (treasurer).62
The Osa Maliki faction, by forming themselves into a rival cen­
tral leadership council on October 6, had clearly violated party 
conventions. There was no precedent, let alone provision in the 
party constitution, for such a step. Moreover, Osa Maliki supporters 
subsequently conceded this fact by attributing de jure status to the 
leadership council of Ali Sastromidjojo and only de facto status to 
their own faction: "There were those who hesitated faced with the
'legality' of the DPP-PNI Ali-Surachman' on the one hand and the 
'reality' and purity of the 'DPP-PNI Osa-Usep' on the other."63 Thus, 
if a divided party may be defined as one in which at least one group
57. Ibid.
58. 0. G. Roeder, The Smiling General (Djakarta: Gunung Agung, 1969), 
p. 24.
59. Angkatan Bersendjata, October 7, 1965 quoted in U. S. Embassy 
Translation Unit Press Review (October 7, 1965).
60. Deklarasi Pembentukan D.P.P.-P.N.I. Osa-Usep (Deppenprop DPP-PNI, 
October 7, 1965), p. TT
61. Ibid., p . 3.
62. Ibid.
63. Laporan Umum Dewan Pimpinan Pusat Partai Nasional Indonesia pada: 
Sidang ke-I Madjelis Permusjawaratan Partai P.N.I./Front Marnaenis 
Tgl. 28 s/d 30 Nopember 1966 Pi Djakarta (Mimeographed), p. 4.
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by-passes or exceeds the limits imposed by party convention for the 
resolution of differences of opinion or rival ambitions for party 
office, then by early October the PNI fit such a definition.
The Contestants
A closer examination of the Ali and Osa Maliki factions and 
their supporters reveals that ethnic and regional differences 
underlay the conflict between the two factions. If the 140 members 
who were suspended from the PNI between August 4 and October 1 for 
lending support to the Osa Maliki faction6* may be regarded as repre­
sentative of the faction as a whole, then, as the following table 
makes clear, it consisted largely of non-Javanese, among whom the 
Sundanese (West Java) were predominant.
Table 1. Ethnic and Regional Composition of Members 
Suspended from the PNI and its Mass Organi­
zations between May 12 and October 1, 1965, 
for supporting the Osa Maliki faction.
Region Number Percentage of Total
At j eh 7 5.0
North Sumatra 2 1.42
West Sumatra 3 2.14
Banten/West Java 3 2.14
Dj akarta 34 24.28
West Java 43 30.71
Central Java 15 10.71
East Java 26 18.60
Sulawes i/Makasar 7 5.0
Total 140 100.00
Source: Fungsionaris PNI/GMM Jang Ditindak Oleh Ali-
Surachman (Mimeogra^hedy.
In the 1955 general elections the PNI gained only 37.5 percent 
of its vote in non-Javanese areas.64 5 If this distribution of the 
PNI vote in 1955 can be taken as a rough guide to the proportion of - 
Javanese and non-Javanese members in the party in 1965, then, clearly,
64. For details of the suspension of these members from the party, 
see Warta Bhakti, August 28, September 1, 3, 1965 and Suluh 
Indonesia, August 20, 28, 1965; see also J. Eliseo Rocamora,
"The Partai Nasional Indonesia,11 p. 179.
65. This percentage was calculated from figures to be found in Herbert 
Feith, The Indonesian Elections of 1955 (Ithaca: Cornell Modern 
Indonesia Project, 1957), pp. 58, 85.
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the non-Javanese, or more precisely, people resident in non-Javanese 
areas, were overrepresented in the ranks of the Osa Maliki faction.
The other side of this coin, of course, is that non-Javanese must 
have been underrepresented among the supporters of the Ali leadership. 
Indeed, according to its own assessment, this appeared to be the case. 
Immediately prior to the Extraordinary Congress, the Ali leadership 
calculated that it would command a majority of congress votes in 
Central Java (including the Special Region of Jogjakarta), East Java, 
and North Sumatra, whereas it estimated that the Osa Maliki faction 
would command a majority in West Java, Atjeh, and South Sulawesi.66
If this characterization of the ethnic bases of the two groupings 
is correct, the question arises: What factor did the non-Javanese PNI
members hold in common which set them sufficiently apart from the 
Javanese members to be able to explain, in part at least, the division 
which occurred in the party in September? Nominally Islamic non- 
Javanese PNI members do not share the antipathy of their Javanese 
counterparts67 for devout Moslems.68 Relatively tolerant of Islam, 
they are much more inclined to perceive a threat in communism or, 
more precisely, the PKI. Javanese PNI members, on the other hand, 
have been more susceptible to the appeals of communism69 and highly 
distrustful of Islam, especially in its modernist political form, as 
represented by such organizations as Masjumi and the Islamic Student 
Association (Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam or HMI). They feared that such 
organizations wished to turn the Indonesian state into an Islamic 
theocracy.
Thus the Ali leadership chose to support Sukarno, rather than 
oppose the PKI, not only because of Sukarno's considerable influence 
within the PNI and his standing as the trusted founder of the Indonesian 
National Party, but also because he had, since 1945, stood clearly 
and unequivocally for a secular, that is non-Islamic, Indonesian
66. Daftar Rekap PNI (Mimeographed), p. 1.
67. The statement that PNI members are nominally Islamic is based on 
the assumption that devout Moslems join the specifically Islamic 
parties, such as Masjumi (until its banning in 1960), Partai 
Sarekat Islam Indonesia (PSII), and NU.
68. Daniel Lev (The Transition to Guided Democracy, p. 95) has stated 
that "West Javanese RNl leaders did not perceive in Islam the 
threat feared by PNI supporters in the ethnic Javanese areas of 
the island." In a similar vein, Feith (The Indonesian Elections, 
p. 82) has pointed out that outside the islands of Java and Bali 
"a self-conscious group of anti-Moslem Moslems, the equivalent of 
the Javanese abangan" do not exist. The fact that these two 
writers disagree on the religious orientation of the Sundanese 
should be borne in mind in assessing the worth of the argument. 
For a discussion of the Javanese abangan, see C. Geertz, The 
Religion of Java (New York: The Free Press, 1969), pp. 11-112.
69. For example, in the 1957 regional elections the PKI captured a 
large segment of the former PNI electoral support. Donald 
Hindley, The Communist Party of Indonesia 1951-1965 (Berkeley 
and Los Angeles: University of California Rress, 1964), p. 224.
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state.70 Although the Islamic state issue lost most of its urgency 
when Masjumi was banned in 1960, it regained it, as shall be seen, 
after October 1, 1965.
Members of the Osa Maliki faction attached less importance to 
Sukarno’s role as guardian of the non-Islamic state, as they were 
less inclined to attribute such political designs to the Islamic 
organizations in the first place. They were far more concerned 
about the Ali leadership's seemingly uncritical acceptance of Sukarno's 
policies at a time when he appeared to them to be falling increasing­
ly under the influence of the PKI. Thus they chose to oppose the 
PKI, rather than support Sukarno, by building up anti-communist 
opinion in the party.
Obviously, the difference between the two groups should not 
be cast solely in cultural terms. The antipathy of the Osa Maliki 
faction for the PKI was bound to attract the more politically con­
servative members of the party--at least so long as they regarded 
communism as a greater threat to their positions than the political 
aspirations of Indonesian Islam, and, indeed, it is in these terms 
that the support of the Javanese Hadisubeno for the Osa Maliki faction 
is to be explained. Likewise, the Ali leadership's close identifi­
cation with and support of the President attracted those younger 
party members for whom Sukarno's radical nationalism had appeal, and 
it is for this reason that the predominately non-Javanese leaders 
of the mass organizations supported the Ali group. Just as the 
different political orientations of the Javanese and non-Javanese 
members of the PNI contribute to an explanation of the division with­
in the party, they also help explain why the rival groupings sought 
the outside allies they did in the struggle for control of the party.
The Alliances
The preparedness of various political forces to intervene 
actively in the PNI leadership struggle suggests that the PNI was 
too important a political factor to ignore in the struggle that was 
taking shape between army and Sukarno-led forces. The reasons for 
its importance lay principally in its large mass base, the influence 
it enjoyed in the state bureaucracy, and the fact that it had the 
largest parliamentary representation of any political party.71
Army support for the Osa Maliki faction, which was forthcoming 
as early as August 21, assumed a more concrete form in mid-October 
when Brigadier General Sutjipto of KOTI instructed all the regional 
military commanders of Indonesia to allow the Osa faction a free hand
70. "Belief in the One Deity," and not an Islamic confession of faith, 
was one of the five principles which Sukarno advocated in June 
1945 as a basis for an independent Indonesia. Subsequently, these 
five principles, or Pantja Sila, were adopted as the official 
ideology of the Republic.
71. See Herbert Feith, "The Dynamics of Guided Democracy," in Ruth 
T. McVey, ed., Indonesia (New Haven: HRAF, 1967), p. 345.
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in ridding the PNI of Gestapu elements.72 Moreover, G&neral Sutjipto 
informed the PNI of this move in a letter addressed to "The Chairman 
of the Central Leadership Council of the Indonesian National Party."73 745
Clearly, KOTI had extended recognition to the Osa Maliki faction as 
the leaders of the PNI.
In line with the political orientation of its predominately non- 
Javanese members, the Osa Maliki faction was quick to cooperate with 
Islamic organizations such as PSII, NU, and Muhammadijah, in addition 
to the two Christian parties and various functional groups. These 
organizations subsequently joined to form the Kesatuan Aksi Pengganjangan 
Gestapu (Crush Gestapu Action Front) or KAP/Gestapu, which demanded 
the dissolution of the PKI.71* The Ali leadership continued to offer 
its undivided support to Sukarno. It even committed itself in advance 
to support whatever decision the President might reach regarding the 
PKI.7® The fact remains, however, that the physical elimination of 
the PKI by the army and its civilian supporters proceeded apace from 
mid-October until January 1966. Under such circumstances, who else 
could the President turn to apart from the PNI? Did not this change 
of circumstances provide the PNI with an opportunity to reestablish 
a close relationship with Bung Karno--to approximate that ideal (and 
idealized) state of affairs that had existed in 1927 when Sukarno had 
been chairman and people such as Ali active members of the Indonesian 
National Party. Such a relationship, however, would obviously be of 
little consequence if the President were to lose out in his power 
struggle with the army, and the task the Ali leadership set itself 
was to lend such support as it could to the President. The inevitable 
price of such a policy was that it incurred the further anger of the 
army high command.
The Ali leadership's fears concerning the designs of the Islamic 
political groups assumed renewed urgency after October 1 and provided 
it with additional incentive to rally to the President. Pointing 
suspiciously to the prominence of such Islamic organizations as PSII, 
Muhammadijah, and NU in KAP/Gestapu, it argued that their aim was not 
merely the dissolution of the PKI but also the overthrow of Sukarno 
and the PNI in order to facilitate the establishment of an Islamic 
state. An epigramatic statement of this point of view was published 
in bold type in the pro-Sukarno newspaper Genta: "ANTI BUNG KARNO =
ANTI PANTJASILA = PENGCHIANAT [TRAITOR]."76
72. Angkatan Bersendjata, October 20, 1965.
73. Letter, Sutjipto SH Brigdjen TNI Komando Operasi Tertinggi Ketua 
Gabungan V to Jth. Ketua Dewan Pimpinan Pusat Partai Nasional 
Indonesia di Djakarta, October 15, 1965, (Mimeographed).
74. See Api Pantjasila, October 22, 1965.
75. Sokoguru Revolusi, November 5, 1965.
76. Genta, February 4, 1966. A similar although considerably more 
subtle statement of this point of view is to be found in an edi­
torial in the Catholic newspaper, Kompas, as early as October 22, 
1965. In the same month Major General Ibrahim Adjie declared in 
a speech to members of West Java branches of the PNI that the 
counter-revolutionaries will not cease in their efforts to replace 
the state ideology (Pantja Sila) and to seize power. The full text 
of his speech may be found in Angkatan Bersendjata, October 25, 26, 
27, 28, 29, 1965.
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The Ali leadership's choice of allies among the various student 
organizations was also largely determined by its concern both to 
support the President and to stem any resurgence of Islamic political 
aspirations. Thus, it instructed GMNI not to join KAMI.77 It ob­
viously believed that GMNI's participation in an overtly anti-PKI 
organization would jeopardize its relations with the President. The 
prominence in KAMI of modernist Islamic political organizations such 
as HMI, which had enjoyed a close association with Masjumi prior to 
its banning in 1960, and Ikatan Mahasiswa Muhammadijah, the student 
association of Muhammadijah, a former constituent organization of 
Masjumi, not to mention Persatuan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia (PMII) 
and Serikat Mahasiswa Muslimin Indonesia (SEMMI), the ancillary 
student organizations of NU and PSII respectively, aroused the Ali 
leadership's suspicions of its intentions as had the presence of 
Muhammadijah, NU and PSII in KAP/Gestapu. For example, GMNI attempted 
to clarify its position with respect to KAMI in a statement of early 
November in which it warned of the need "to oppose the efforts of the 
right wing reactionaries [i.e., members of the banned Masjumi party] 
who wish to rehabilitate themselves in the wave of destruction of the 
September 30th Movement and divert our left wing Pantjasila revolu­
tion to the right. . . . "78 The Osa Maliki faction, as noted above, 
did not perceive such a threat from the Islamic organizations, and 
so the recently established GMNI (Osa Maliki faction) joined KAMI.79
The Iskaq Committee
On May 29, 1965, Iskaq Tjokrohadisurjo, a prominent and long 
standing member of the PNI, wrote a letter to the central leadership 
council requesting that a meeting of the consultative body of the 
party be called to examine the council's decision to remove Hadisubeno 
from the Central Java branch leadership and suspend Oemar Said,
Soetopo Koesoemodirdjo, And Soegeng Tirtosiswojo from the party mem­
bership.80 The meeting did not eventuate.
After the leadership council suspended Osa Maliki, Hardi, and 
their associates from the party on August 4, Iskaq, Sumaneng, and 
a number of other like-minded party men, at a meeting in Djakarta 
on August 13, called on the party leadership to convene an emergency 
congress in order to resolve the dispute within the party.81 This
77. Hasil2 Pertemuan Tanggal 25 Oktober 1966 [sic] Hasil Risalah/
Notulen Tertemuan [sicj TsbtTi (Mimeographed) , passim^ For a 
full list of the member organizations of KAMI, see Angkatan 
Bersendjata, October 29, 1965. For a general account of EKe 
activities of this organization, see Harsja W. Bachtiar, "Indonesia" 
in Donald K. Emmerson, ed., Students and Politics in Developing 
Countries (London: Pall Mall Press, 1968).
78. Sokoguru Revolusi, November 13, 1965.
79. Letter, Kartomo to Kombes Sumirat, n.d.
80. Letter, Iskaq Tjokrohadisurjo S.H. to Jth. Sdr. Dewan Pimpinan 
Pusat Partai Nasional Indonesia, Djalan Tegalan No. 1, Djakarta,
May 29, 1965 (Mimeographed).
81. Surat Keputusan Tentang Saran2 Djalan Keluar Guna Mengatasi Segala 
Akibat Dari Peristiwa 4 Agustus 1965 (Mimeographed, Djakarta, August 
13, 1965) .
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appeal was almost identical to the one contained in the letter sent by 
Osa Maliki and his associates to members of the central leadership on 
August 3.
After the open establishment of the DPP-PNI (Osa Maliki faction) 
on October 6 and its recognition by KOTI on October 15, Iskaq argued 
that such a congress, if it was not to prejudice the aspirations of 
one faction in advance, could now only be convened by a "third party."82 
In an attempt to assume this role, Iskaq and his colleagues formed 
themselves into the Panitia Penegak Persatuan dan Kesatuan PNI-FM 
(Committee for the Maintenance of the Unity of the PNI-FM).83 84
Not only had Iskaq and his committee pleaded the cases of the 
suspended party members and echoed their call for a congress, but 
they had also elevated the Osa Maliki faction, following the KOTI 
letter, to the position of one of two equal disputants within the 
PNI. As this directly contradicted the position of the Ali leadership, 
which did not even recognize the existence of a split within the party, 
doubt was cast on the veracity of Iskaq's claim to impartiality by 
Ali's son, Kama Radjasa, amongst others. He alleged that the Iskaq 
committee was not a "third party" but a front organization of the 
"Hardi-Isnaeni clique."81* It is hardly surprising, therefore, that 
the Ali leadership declared in a letter distributed to the party's 
branches that it neither supported nor had any contact with Iskaq's 
committee.85 Moreover, it announced its intention of holding a 
session of the Congress Working Committee in Lembang, West Java, 
between December 18 and 20.86
The Osa Maliki faction immediately declared that it would not 
attend such a session at that time.87 This move was apparently 
inspired by the belief that the committee offered even fewer opportun­
ities than a congress to press its leadership claims upon the party,
82. Letters, Iskaq Tjokrohadisurjo to Jth. Saudara Ali Sastroamidjojo 
SH Ketua Umum Partai Nasional Indonesia di Djakarta and Jth.
Saudara Osa Maliki Ketua Umum Partai Nasional Indonesia di 
Djakarta, October 18, 1965.
83. The committee consisted of the following members: chairman,
Iskaq Tjokrohadisurjo S.H.; vice-chairman, Dr. Soeharto; secretary, 
I. A. Muis; treasurer, Achmad Suladji; head of information section, 
Soebagio Reksodipuro S.H.; assistants, Nj. Supeni, Nj. Jusupandi, 
Soemaneng S.H., Djaswadi Suprapto, M. Tabrani, Noor Sutan Iskandar, 
and B. J. Rambitan. Berta Republik, November 25, 1965.
84. This charge is recounted in Teks Pidato Lengkap Sdr. Iskaq
Tjokrohadisurjo, Anggota Badan Pekerdja Kongres P.I.N. [sic] jang 
sedianja diutjapkan aalam sidang Badan Pekerdja Kongres ke 11 
Jang berlangsung di Jogjakarta pada tg. 22 dan 23 Desember 1965 
(Mimeographed), p. 7~.
85. Duta Masjarakat, December 18, 1965.
86. Undangan Sidang Badan Pekerdja Kongres ke II D.P.P.-P.N.I, kepada 
Jth. Sdr. Iskaq Tjokrohadisurjo Anggota BPK PNI Djakarta, 30 
Nopember 1965 (Mimeographed).
87. Berita Republik, December 3, 1965.
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and that it would therefore be better to hold out in hope of the lat­
ter rather than accepting the former. After all, Osa Malikifs sup­
porters could expect little from a party organization made up of 
plenary members of the central leadership council that had suspended 
them and their regional and mass organization appointees from party 
membership.88 The prospects for a party congress convened under favor­
able circumstances would be greatly enhanced if their allies should 
prove victorious in the national power struggle. But as its outcome 
was still uncertain in December 1965, it was clearly in the interests 
of the Osa Maliki faction to play for time by refusing to attend 
the conference of the Congress Working Committee.
Immediately prior to the Committee session, Iskaq gained addi­
tional support for his proposal for party unity. On December 17,
24 out of a total of 43 PNI members of parliament89 called for the 
convening of an extraordinary congress in the shortest possible time 
to be administered by a body or committee acceptable to both sides.90 
The national leadership of the Djamiatul Muslimin Indonesia issued a 
statement signed by Hadji Moh. Djambek, who had replaced Osa Maliki 
as chairman after the latter was suspended from party membership, 
and eight other members calling for an extraordinary congress to be 
organized by "a Body/Committee acceptable to all sides which truly 
desire to maintain the PNI/Front Marhaenis intact,"91
The Congress Working Committee meeting which was finally held 
on December 22 in Jogjakarta92 met these demands half-way. It decided 
to hold a congress, but not an extraordinary one. Instead, it agreed 
to call together the eleventh Congress ahead of schedule in March 
1966. This decision meant, of course, that it would be held under 
the auspices of the incumbent leadership and not a group or committee 
acceptable to both sides.93 The Osa Maliki faction promptly declared 
that if the Iskaq committee proved unable to hold a party congress,
88. For details of the composition of the Badan Pekerdja Kongres, see 
Berita Republik, December 10, 1965.
89. This number is based on the number of PNI members listed in Daftar 
Alamat Anggota Dewan Perwakilan Rakjat Gotong Rojong (Sekretariat 
DPR-GR7 Djakarta, August 15, 1965); cfT the figure "of 44 given by 
Feith, "Dynamics of Guided Democracy,” p. 345.
90. Pernj ataan (Mimeographed, Djakarta, December 17 , 1965). For a 
press account (which erroneously attributes the statement to
28 members), see Kompas, December 24, 1965. Of the 24, at least 
3 (Rh. Koesnan, B. J. Rambitan, and Soebagio Reksodipoero) were 
closely associated with Iskaq!s Committee.
91. Sokoguru Revolusi, December 21, 1965. Italics in the original.
92. Berita Republik, December 16, 1965. The fact that the meeting was 
not heTd in Lembang as originally intended has been attributed to 
the action of the West Java Military Commander, Major General 
Ibrahim Adjie, who allegedly refused permission for it to be held 
in his area of jurisdiction. Ibid.
93. Sinar Harapan, December 29, 1965.
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then it would call one of its own.9If Thus, by year’s end, these 
various attempts to resolve the division in the PNI by means of a con­
ventional congress had come to nothing. The party remained divided.
Political Change, 1965-1966
It has been pointed out that the Osa Maliki faction had gained the 
active support of the army high command, KAP/Gestapu, and KAMI. In 
the other camp, there had been some signs of rapprochment with President 
Sukarno who, without the PKI to lean on, had become more susceptible 
to the blandishments of the Ali leadership. This group also enjoyed 
considerable support in the bureaucracy and sections of the armed 
forces. Indeed, as we have seen, in the case of the police force 
this support extended, at least for a period, to its commander-in­
chief. The point about these alliances and associations was that they 
had been made with the rival contenders for national power. Therefore, 
the national conflict, provided it was resolved first, would obviously 
have considerable bearing on the outcome of the PNI leadership struggle. 
Just how much bearing it would have would depend on the extent to 
which the victor, or victors, chose to become involved in PNI affairs. 
Given this partial interdependence at least between the national power 
struggle and the PNI leadership struggle, we shall now pay attention 
to the former in the hope of subsequently clarifying the latter.
Only days after General Suharto had defeated the September 30th 
Movement in Djakarta, the city was engulfed by anti-PKI demonstrations 
organized by student organizations and political parties, which sub­
sequently formed the constituent bodies of KAMI and KAP/Gestapu, with 
the support of the army. The government gave these demonstrations 
an inadvertent boost with its harsh anti-inflationary measures of 
November and December. In late November it raised the official price 
of petrol from Rp. 4 per litre to Rp. 250 per litre.94 5 The following 
month it raised the price again to Rp. 1,000 per litre.96 A commen­
surate price increase was also ordered for, among other things, bus 
fares.9'
These measures provided KAMI with a genuinely popular issue--the 
demand that these price increases should be revoked^8 --and a scapegoat, 
namely, the minister responsible for the increases, Dr. Chairul Saleh.99 
And to this goal the students attached their long standing demand for
94. Ibid., December 31, 1965.
95. D. H. Penny, MSurvey of Recent Developments,11 Bulletin of Indonesian 
Economic Studies, No. 3 (February 1966), pp. 1-T.
96. Ibid.; Sinar Harapan, December 30, 1965.
97. Penny, "Survey of Recent Developments," p. 2.
98. Kompas, January 15, 1966.
99. Cf. Harsja Bachtiar’s more sympathetic portrayal of KAMI’S motives, 
"Indonesia," p. 194.
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the banning of the PKI and a more recent one calling for a "retooling" 
of the cabinet.100
It was with this last demand that Sukarno took issue in a speech 
before his cabinet, students, and journalists on January 15, 1966.
The real target of those who demanded a "retooling" of the cabinet, 
he asserted, was not the cabinet ministers themselves, but the Presi­
dent: ", . . it is not you, Chairel Saleh. . . .  In effect every­
thing points at Sukarno."101 By choosing to interpret a criticism 
of his ministers as criticism of himself, Sukarno forfeited consider­
able area for maneuver. He could not now allow his ministers to bear 
the brunt of criticism, let alone sacrifice them, in the name of 
political expediency. Yet, such actions would have been quite con­
sistent with the view of many members of KAMI and KAP/Gestapu that it 
was not President Sukarno but his ministers who were at fault.
Sukarno's "January 9, 1905"102 had not yet come, but by taking such 
a stand he had only hastened its arrival.
One can only assume that he still placed very considerable store 
by his own political resources. And such an assumption appears to 
be borne out by the remarkable contents of the remainder of the speech. 
Declaring himself responsible to the nation, Almighty God, and the 
Prophet Muhammad and likening his stance to that of Martin Luther in 
the Wilrtemberg Cathedral,103 he continued:
Come on, whoever like Sukarno, agrees with Sukarno, 
as Great Leader of the Revolution, join forces, 
form your ranks, maintain Sukarno! Because I see that 
other people wish to overthrow Sukarno. Only I say 
to my followers, don't take wild steps! Wait for 
my command!10 ^
Cognizant of the President's still widespread support, most 
political groupings moved hastily to declare their loyalty for 
Sukarno. General Suharto issued a statement which declared that 
the army "stands behind the President/Great Leader of the Revolu­
tion waiting for his command."105 In an apparent attempt to estab­
lish military control over the Sukarno Front, Suharto, in a KOTI 
announcement, ordered all mass organizations, political parties, 
and persons who were willing to carry out the President's command
100. Kompas, January 15, 1966.
101. Amanat PJM Presiden Sukarno Pi Sidang Paripurna Kabinet 
Dwikora Dengan Dihadiri Djuga Oleh Wakil-Wakil Dari Mahasiswa-- 
Mahasiswa Dan Wartawan, Bogor, 15 Djanuari 1966 (Mimeographed, 
Sekretariat Negara Kabinet Presiden Republik Indonesia), p. 16.
102. This was the date when the Petersburg workers ceased to believe 
"in the good kind Tsar who was fooled by his wicked ministers." 
Eugenia S. Ginzburg, Into the Whirlwind (Melbourne: Penguin, 
1968), p. 225.
103. Amanat PJM Presiden Sukarno Pi Sidang, p. 16.
104. Ibid., pp. 16-17.
105. Berita Yudha, January 17, 1966.
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to submit their names either to the KOTI office in Djakarta or to 
the office of the Regional Military Commanders.106
Of course, the Ali leadership needed no prompting. Delighted 
by Sukarno's fighting speech, it declared " . . .  that it stands 
fully and without reserve behind Bung Karno and is prepared to imple­
ment the command of the President/Commander-in-Chief of the Armed 
Forces/Great Leader of the Revolution/Father of Marhaenism."107 The 
enthusiasm of the party leadership was more than matched by GMNI and 
other PNI mass organization members who gathered in front of the 
Presidential palace on January 20 to listen to an address by the 
President. They carried signs, one of which stated: "The People--
ABRI [Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia] love Bung Karno."108 
Another declared that its bearer was "prepared to die for Bung 
Karno."109 After the rally was over, they became involved in a fight 
with KAMI members. An armed forces unit moved in amidst a hail of 
stones to separate the warring sides.110
Then, on February 21, President Sukarno announced that he had, 
as he put it, "perfected" the composition of the cabinet. He did 
not, however, demote Chairul Saleh or Dr. Subandrio as KAMI and KAP/ 
Gestapu had demanded, but instead he demoted three people who had 
been closely associated with the anti-PKI movement and who enjoyed 
high prestige in military, KAP/Gestapu, and KAMI circles, namely 
General Nasution, Arudji Kartawinata, and Vice-Admiral Martadinata.111 
Furthermore, he promoted Sumardjo and Asmara Hadi, regarded by many 
as crypto-communists, to ministerial rank. The former was given the 
important and, in light of student unrest, sensitive portfolio of 
Basic Education and Culture. Piling insult upon injury, he even 
appointed the well-known Djakarta gang leader, Lieutenant Colonel 
Imam Sjafe'i, to the position of minister seconded to the President for 
Special Security Affairs.112
What had prompted the President to take such a provocative step? 
Above all, it appears he believed that the time had come to make a 
stand in order to stop the various efforts to "divert the Indonesian 
revolution to the right."113 Sukarno was desperately anxious to con­
106. Dwikora, January 21, 1966.
107. Genta, January 17, 1966.
108. Pelopor, January 21, 1966.
K)9. Ibid.
110. Berita Yudha, January 21, 1966.
111. For President Sukarno's announcement and a list of members of the 
perfected cabinet, see Pengumuman PJM Presiden Sukarno Mengenai 
Susunan Kabinet Dwikora Jang Disempurnakan, Istana Merdeka 
Djakarta, 21 Pebruari 1966 iMimeograpEiecr, Sekretariat Negara 
Kabinet Presiden Republik' Indonesia) . Further details about the 
cabinet may be found in Indonesia, No. 2 (October 1966), p. 185 f.
112. Ibid.
113. Amanat PJM Presiden Sukarno Pada Peringatan Sapta Warsa GSNI 
X~Gerakan Siswa Nasional Indonesia) Pi Istora Senajan, Djakarta,
28 Pebruari 1966 (Mimeographed^ Sekretariat Negara Kabinet 
Presiden Republik Indonesia), p. 1.
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tinue ruling, and if he could not rule, then he did not want to reign 
either.
Outraged by the President's action, KAMI blocked all access roads 
to the Presidential palace on the morning of February 24 in a deter­
mined bid to prevent the swearing in of the new cabinet ministers. 
Although they managed to delay the ceremony for three hours, they were 
unsuccessful in preventing it from taking place as most of the minis­
ters were eventually able to reach the palace either in the President's 
helicopter, or in the case of the less fortunate ones, on foot. Con­
sequently, the students gathered in front of the palace to show their 
disapproval of the new cabinet's composition. The Presidential guard 
tried to disperse the demonstrators first by firing into the air and 
then into the crowd itself. One student, Arief Rachman Hakim, a mem­
ber of GMNI (Osa Maliki faction), was shot dead.114 Eighteen others 
were wounded.115 At Hakim's funeral, attended by thousands of stu­
dents, wreaths from Lieutenant General Suharto, General Nasution,
Major. General Ibrahim Adjie, and many others were laid.116 There 
could be little doubt that this last act of Sukarno's had exhausted 
the patience of Suharto.
Suharto continued, however, to move cautiously. He was willing 
to mouth support for the President, thereby depriving military com­
manders of a choice between the President and himself. He also worked 
quietly to prevent Sukarno from developing any organized support of 
his own by coopting any initiative he took in this area. An example 
of this was his order, mentioned above, that all Sukarno Front sup­
porters must register with KOTI or their regional military commanders.
In addition to containing the President's influence in this way, 
Suharto was also intent upon whittling it away. Thus he did nothing 
to prevent KAMI with the support and protection of Colonel Sarwo 
Edhie, the energetic and single-minded commander of the Resimen Para 
Komando Angkatan Darat (Army Commando Regiment or RPKAD), from con­
stantly agitating for the dissolution of the PKI and a further re­
tooling of the cabinet. Indeed, he was quite prepared to let Sarwo 
Edhie and the students "ride shotgun" in this way for him even 
though from Suharto's point of view it was premature to take decisive 
action against the President. It was they who incurred the hostility 
of the pro-Sukarno forces for the chaos which they wrought, involving 
as it did an open flouting of the President's will, whereas Suharto 
was the ultimate beneficiary of their actions insofar as they brought 
about a decline in Sukarno's authority.
114. Kompas, February 26, 1966. If he really were a member of the 
GMNI [Osa Maliki faction) it is difficult to explain why it did - 
not claim him as one of its own in a message of condolence pub­
lished two days later in the same paper. See Kompas, February 
28, 1966. It is possible that he was a member of another KAMI 
affiliated organization who joined GMNI (Osa Maliki faction) to 
help swell its ranks and thereby give the impression that it 
commanded greater support than was the case.
115. "Menengok Sebentar Rangkaian Peristiwa Indonesia ditahun silam," 
Kompas, December 31, 1966.
116. Kompas, February 26, 1966.
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In early February, President Sukarno accepted an invitation from 
the Ali leadership to address a rally of the Gerakan Siswa Nasional 
Indonesia (Indonesian National Pupils’ Movement or GSNI) , the PNI high 
school student front, on February 28 in Djakarta.117 This was the 
day after Iskaq’s congress was scheduled to begin in Bandung. This 
acceptance provided further evidence, if any was needed, of Sukarno's 
preference for the Ali leadership in the PNI leadership struggle.
On February 28, Sukarno delivered a low-key speech stating that he 
interpreted the rally as a demonstration of GSNI's loyalty to Bung 
Karno as Great Leader of the Revolution,118 1920 however, the presence at 
the rally of his two top aides, Chairul Saleh and Dr. Subandrio, as 
well as Sumardjo suggests that Sukarno attached great importance to 
it. Dr. Subandrio, in a sensational speech which he had presumably 
cleared with the President beforehand, called on GSNI to confront the 
terror of those who wish to divert the revolution to the right with 
"counter-terror.Ml19 Presumably, he looked to GSNI support in 
particular and PNI mass support in general to counter the militant 
anti-government activities of the student organizations affiliated 
with KAMI, which had been officially banned by the President two days 
earlier.1 20
No sooner had the rally ended than Ali leadership supporters 
attacked KAMI students at the University of Indonesia, inflicting one 
casualty121 12 before being driven off by a unit of the armed forces.
And on March 4, Djakarta citizens were treated to the spectacle of 
thousands of high school students organized less than a month before 
into the Kesatuan Aksi Pemuda Peladjar Indonesia (Indonesian Youth 
and Student Action Front or KAPPI) over-running and occupying the 
Department of Basic Education and Culture to protest Sumardjo's 
appointment.12 2
On March 8, PNI (Ali leadership) mass organization members demon­
strated in front of the United States Embassy shouting: "Green is 
anti-Bung Karno."123 * Many succeeded in gaining access to the embassy 
grounds where they set fire to a number of diplomatic cars. Eventually, 
they were driven away by a small detachment of soldiers.121* A little 
earlier, KAPPI students invaded the Department of Foreign Affairs, 
situated only half a mile from the US Embassy, upturning furniture, 
tearing up documents, and painting anti-Subandrio slogans on the 
walls. Finally, they withdrew from the building125 only to run into
117. Sinar Revolusi, February 10, 1966.
118. Amanat PJM Presiden Sukarno Pada Peringatan, p. 1.
119. Kompas, March 1, 1966.
120. Dwikora, February 26, 1966.
121. Kompas, December 31, 1966.
122. Kompas, March 5, 1966.
123. Marshall Green was the US Ambassador to Indonesia at that time. 
Dwikora, March 9, 1966.
124. Ibid.
125. Kompas, March 9, 1966.
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the PNI demonstrators.126 A sharp clash ensued which armed forces 
units were only able to break up after firing warning shots above 
the heads of the feuding students.127
On March 11, President Sukarno hurriedly left a cabinet session 
in Djakarta for Bogor on the basis of a report from the Presidential 
guard that armed forces without insignia had surrounded the palace.128 
On March 12 it was announced over the radio that President Sukarno 
had entrusted General Suharto "to take all necessary steps to guar­
antee peace, calm, and stability as well as the personal safety and 
authority of the President . . . for the sake of the integrity of 
the Nation and the State of the Republic of Indonesia."129 From 
this new position of authority, Suharto was able to pursue more ef­
fectively his skillful policy of whittling away the power of the 
President while maintaining a credible public posture of loyalty to 
him. For example, on March 12, he banned the PKI "in the name of 
his Excellency [President Sukarno],"130 a step which Sukarno had 
refused to take because he had desired to maintain this base of his 
own power as well as his concept of a NASAKOM state. He did not 
reshuffle the President's "perfected" cabinet announced on February 
21; rather, he "perfected it again."
Most people were surprised by the announcement of March 12.
The member organizations of KAP/Gestapu, including the Osa Maliki 
faction of the PNI, were, of course, happily surprised. The Ali 
leadership was surprised too, bitterly surprised. Just as a new period 
of close PNI-Presidential cooperation appeared to be emerging out of 
the political upheaval of the last six months, Sukarno had abandoned 
them.131 The outcome of the national leadership struggle had clearly 
worked to the advantage of the Osa Maliki faction. Just how much 
advantage it would reap, however, would depend on the degree to 
which the victor, General Suharto, chose to involve himself in the 
PNI leadership struggle.
The PNI Extraordinary Congress
Little progress had been made since December 1965 in attempts 
to resolve this struggle by means of a congress. Despite vigorous
126. Dwikora, March 9, 1966.
127. Ibid.
128. For Brigadier General Sutjipto's account of these events, see 
Kompas, April 9 and 11, 1966. According to all interview accounts, 
the unmarked forces were army commandos (RPKAD) acting under the 
orders of Colonel Sarwo Edhie. It is not known to this writer 
whether he had gained General Suharto's approval for this action
or not.
129. Kompas, March 14, 1966.
1.30. Ibid.
131. Several prominent members of the Ali faction expressed this view 
to the writer. In fairness to Sukarno it ought to be stated that 
during those critical days he was quite literally fighting for 
his political life and, therefore, in no position to come to the 
assistance of the PNI.
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action by Iskaq on behalf of the committee's planned congress, to be 
held in Bandung, his efforts in this direction ultimately came to 
nought. After postponing the congress till February 27,1 3 2 it was 
again postponed to a date to be decided, despite the arrival of some 
branch delegates in Bandung. These were made up exclusively, or so 
it would appear from their statements, of supporters of the Osa 
Maliki faction.132 33 Presumably, the number of these delegates was in­
sufficient to be able to convene a congress.13  ^ In addition, the 
military commander of Central Java, Brigadier General Surjosumpeno, 
denied the Ali leadership permission to convene the eleventh PNI 
congress in Jogjakarta.135 1367
General Suharto rapidly put an end to this stalemate. Only five 
days after receiving the President's order, he succeeded where Iskaq 
had failed, by bringing the Ali leadership and the Osa Maliki faction 
together at a meeting. 36 At the third such meeting, on March 24, 
he extracted a joint statement from the two sides.13' It declared 
that both groups agreed to hold an extraordinary congress, something 
which both the Iskaq committee and the Osa Maliki faction had been 
demanding for several months. The Ali leadership, however, had re­
fused to countenance such demands while declaring its intention to 
hold the eleventh party congress ahead of schedule in March. The 
statement also laid down the composition of the committee to run the 
congress. Osa Maliki supporters, if we include Iskaq, as the Ali 
leadership certainly would, were placed in three out of the five 
positions, including the chairmanship. They were Iskaq Tjokrohadisurjo 
(chairman), Sunawar Sukowati, and S. Rifa'i. The Ali supporters 
appointed to the committee were Bachtiar Salim Haloho and Soediro.138 
Obviously, the statement favored the Osa Maliki faction.
In view of the very cordial relationship existing between the 
army high command and the Osa Maliki faction, based on a similar 
political viewpoint, past cooperation, and, in the case of Hadisubeno, 
a long standing friendship with Suharto, it was only to be expected 
that once General Suharto decided to intervene in the PNI leadership
132. Kompas, February 28, 1966.
133. Duta Masjarakat, March 7, 1966.
134. A party congress is considered valid if it is attended by delegates 
from at least half the number of branches provided they have 
together gained the votes of two-thirds or more of those eligible 
to vote for congress delegates. Anggaran Rumah Tangga Partai 
Nasional Indonesia (1963), p. 33.
135. Letter, Iskaq Tjokrohadisurjo to Jth. Paduka Brig. Djen.
Surjosumpeno, Panglima Kodam VII Diponegoro di Semarang, February 
17, 1966 (Mimeographed).
136. An attempt by Iskaq to bring together the leaders of both sides 
on January 12 failed because Ali Sastroamidjojo and Sartono re­
fused to attend. Kompas, January 15, 1966.
137. Sinar Harapan, March 25, 1966.
138. Pengumuman-Bersama DPP-PNI (Djakarta, March 24, 1966). For a 
press report on the' Joint Statement, see ibid.
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struggle, he would do so on the side of the Osa Maliki faction. But 
why did he decide to intervene in the first place? If he could suc­
ceed in imposing the leaders of the Osa Maliki faction upon the 
party, then clearly he would gain considerable control over the PNI 
which would reduce his dependence on those political organizations 
with large Islamic components such as KAMI and KAP/Gestapu, which 
had helped elevate him to power.
He would also be able to restore the balance between the Islamic 
and non-Islamic parties which had tipped drastically in favor of the 
former as a result of the internecine conflict in the PNI and the 
physical elimination and formal dissolution of the PKI. It is import­
ant to note that not all the leaders of the Osa Maliki faction supported 
General Suharto's initiative. Osa Maliki, Usep Ranawidjaja, and 
Sabilal Rasjad were among those opposed. When they had been only 
able to indicate a preference between an extraordinary congress and 
a session of the Ali leadership-dominated Congress Working Committee, 
they naturally opted for the former. But now that their hand had 
been strengthened within the party by the favorable outcome of the 
national leadership struggle, they looked forward to a continuation 
of the struggle with the Ali leadership for the allegiance of the 
branches in the belief that they would eventually prevail.139 140
On the other hand, Hadisubeno supported Suharto on this matter.
As a result of his association with the Osa Maliki faction, he 
found himself isolated in the Central Java branch of the PNI, which 
had remained overwhelmingly loyal to the Ali leadership. Moreover, 
the Ali leadership in Central Java enjoyed the almost unanimous sup­
port of the region's district military commanders. By means of a 
unitary congress, Hadisubeno hoped to shed this politically invidious 
association and to rebuild his basis of support within the Central 
Java branch of the party.11*0
Despite this difference of opinion, General Suharto pushed ahead 
with his plans to ensure the victory of the Osa Maliki faction at the 
party congress. For example,- local military commanders were empowered 
to deny delegates authority to attend the congress if they regarded 
them as being in any way associated with or sympathetic to "Gestapu/ 
PKi."1**1 This order represented another victory for the Osa Maliki 
faction, as it had pressed for the exclusion of such people from a 
unitary congress since October 1965. It realized that such an order 
could only reduce the representation of the Ali leadership at such a 
congress, for it was this group which had compromised itself with its 
statement of apparent support for Colonel Untung on October 1, 1965.
A large number of Ali faction delegates who had actually gained 
the requisite authority to attend the congress experienced difficulty, 
in gaining access to the congress hall, and in some cases they were
139. Interview, April 28, 1967.
140. Ibid.
141. Tata Tertib Kongres Persatuan $ Kesatuan PNI/Front Marhaenis 
(Panitya Kongres Persatuan § Kesatuan PNI/Front Marhaenis, 
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turned away at the door.142 14356*8 Indeed, Ali delegates from branches in 
Djakarta and West Java were only permitted to attend the opening 
ceremony on April 24 and the first plenary session.11*3 Others, such 
as Lucien Pahala Hutagaol and Kartjono, were actually arrested by the 
West Java military authorities upon their arrival in Bandung.1 * *
The Ali faction delegates who were able to attend the congress 
were subjected to a constant stream of heckling and abuse from KAMI 
members who were allowed to occupy the balcony of the congress hall.11*5 
Certainly, Iskaq, in his own account of the congress proceedings 
admitted that he, as chairman, "very nearly lost control of the situa­
tion"11*6 when Ali was addressing the congress.11*7 On the other hand, 
"speeches from delegates of branches under the leadership of the 
DPP-PNI Osa-Usep received," he states, "an extraordinary and tumultuous 
response as a sign of agreement."11*8
Between plenary sessions, private negotiations were held between 
the leaders of the two sides. The Osa Maliki faction demanded that 
Ali surrender the PNI leadership to the DPP-PNI Osa-Usep.11*9 Ali 
responded with the proposal that members elected to the PNI leader­
ship council at the Purwokerto Congress should be ineligible to 
stand again for leadership positions.150 Although this proposal 
would have excluded Ali himself from the running, it would also have 
excluded Osa Maliki, Hardi, and Isnaeni. It is not surprising that 
the Osa Maliki faction flatly rejected it.
Eventually, both groups agreed to the appointment of Osa Maliki 
as General Chairman with full authority to choose a new central lead­
ership council,151 with the assistance of S. Hadikusumo, an Ali 
leadership suporter. This agreement, which was approved by a plenary 
session, reflected the dominant position the Osa Maliki faction 
enjoyed at the congress. So too did the composition of the new
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Central Leadership Council.152 Only the sixth chairman, Abdul Madjid 
and the second and third treasurers, Hardjantho S. and Notosukardjo, 
were supporters of the former Ali leadership. The others were all 
either members of the DPP-PNI Osa-Usep as constituted on October 6, 
1965 or close supporters of it.
The Osa Maliki faction's close alliance with General Suharto, 
who had won out in the national power struggle, was an important 
factor in explaining its capture of the PNI leadership. The deci­
sive factor in this regard was General Suharto's preparedness to 
promote actively the cause of this faction within the party. The 
fact that Ali probably had the support of the majority of PNI members 
was of no immediate account, for it was the Osa Maliki faction which 
had the backing of the new national leader. Thus, for the period of 
this study at least, the source of power within the PNI was related 
to the influence possessed by non-party elite figures with whom a 
person or group in the party were associated, and whether they were 
prepared to wield that influence to the advantage of that person 
or group in the internal affairs of the organization. This situa­
tion was likely to continue so long as the party remained divided.
152. The members of the Council were: general chairman, Osa Maliki;
first chairman, Hardi S.H.; second chairman, Sabilal Rasjad; 
third chairman, Mh. Isnaeni; fourth chairman, Hadisubeno; fifth 
chairman, Dr. Sunawar Sukowati; sixth chairman, Abdul Madjid; 
first secretary general, Usep Ranawidjaja; second secretary 
general, I.G.N. Gde Djaksa; third Secretary general, Abadi; 
first treasurer, Budi Dipojuwono; second treasurer, Hardjantho S 
and third treasurer, Notosukardjo. Sinar Harapan, April 28, 
1966.
